Showing 1 - 10 of 46
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010270953
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009305542
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009725706
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009751376
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008737786
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003715272
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012724152
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003731611
We consider a network economy in which economic agents are connected within a structure of value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic activities: autarkic self-provision; binary matching interactions; and multi-person cooperative...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014179168
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009238210