that although correlation tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium, in the presence of … uncertainty, a high level of correlation may discipline the strongly biased expert and may foster the informational content of the … experts’ advice under high uncertainty about correlation. In contrast to what may be expected, it may be optimal for the …

experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with … multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non-monotonic. In particular …, while very small and very large correlation levels are detrimental for truth-telling, intermediate levels of correlation may …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …

. Our findings reveal that project correlation leads to these biases countervailing each other, facilitating the …, our study suggests limited benefits in the context of project correlation. …

two proposals are highly correlated, then the receiver-treatment effect dominates. Furthermore, as the correlation …