In this note we amend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), to examine how agents respond to an exogenous change in incentives. In particular, we apply the theoretical framework to the consequences on the corruption level in Italy of a famous sentence of the Italian Corte di...

In this article we apply and extend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier in their seminal paper (2000), to examine how the economy represented in their theoretical framework responds to an exogenous change in the agent's incentive. In particular, we focus on the consequences of a famous...

In this article we apply and extend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier in their seminal paper (2000), to examine how the economy represented in their theoretical framework responds to an exogenous change in the agent's incentive. In particular, we focus on the consequences of a famous...

This paper investigates econometrically the relationship between corruption and legislative complexity, and their impact on growth rate, welfare and distribution of the per capita income. We perform econometric analysis using new indicators and index of legislative complexity, built in a way...

In this paper we use a dynamic model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity on growth and welfare, in comparison with political corruption. After a careful review of the economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, we set up the model. The main...

In this paper we use a dynamic model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity on growth and welfare, in comparison with political corruption. After a careful review of the economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, we set up the model. The main...