The aim of this paper is to explore under which conditions institutional quality leads to lower corruption. A model of a simple economy where firms both chose between bribing or not bribing bureaucrats to avoid costs and between entering the official or unofficial economy shows that the effects...

In every democracy mass media play a crucial role in assuring the effective working of the political system. In this paper I focus on the role of media as "watchdog". In an agency relationship between politician and citizens, media perform the function of an informed supervisor. Previous works...

Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters...

In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instill norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low....

Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the...

Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the...

Despite its salience in modern politics, political scandal has yet to be treated as a subject of inquiry in political economy. This paper offers a rational choice theory of scandal as the result of the strategic production and use of scarce knowledge regarding politicians, parties, and...

In developing countries with weak institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on elections to instill norms of accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when political competition is too high or too low....

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention when the probability of...