This article uses a comparative analytical approach to examine critically how and why anti-corruption institutional multiplicity has failed to effectively curb corruption in Uganda. The government of Uganda deliberately created several anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption simultaneously...

By contrast with generalisations about corruption being pervasive in Africa, empirical studies show that some citizens pay bribes for public services while others do not. Three theoretical explanations for variations — differences in national context, individual attributes and public services...

Educated citizens are often considered more likely to report corruption; this belief shapes anti-corruption campaigns. However, we know little about how other factors may interact with education’s impact on willingness to report corruption. This paper examines data from a household survey...

To understand the process of bribery we need to integrate measures of individual behaviour and institutional attributes rather than rely exclusively on micro or macro-level measures. Indexes of corruption in national institutions cannot explain how individuals within a country differ in the...

Studies find the poor are more likely to pay bribes than the better off, because of lower status. This paper proposes an alternative explanation: institutions matter. Given a choice between public and private services, the better off exit, but they cannot exit from monopoly services. Heckman...

Anti-corruption campaigns often include an awareness raising component which highlights the negative consequences of corruption; the idea is that awareness will empower citizens to demand a change. However, experiences from developing countries suggest that messages that highlight corruption's...