We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of partisan culture and partisan identity on corruption behavior based on China's Communist Party (CCP). Subjects are randomly assigned to a prime condition that increases the salience of CCP partisan concept or to a control condition in...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce the interventions of the group monitoring and the endogenous crackdown....

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is introduced when the number of public officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines both the merits of the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce a group monitoring mechanism that participants in the...

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines both the merits of the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce a group monitoring mechanism that corrupt officials’...