Participation in social programs, such as clubs and other social organizations, results from a process in which an agent learns about the requirements, benefits, and likelihood of acceptance related to a program, applies to be a participant, and, finally, is accepted or rejected. We propose a...

We consider an economic system composed of interacting potential adopters of a technology. We build a model of interindividual influence effects in which part of the links can be negative, in a context of bounded rational choice. The article shows how the sole relationships topology on a network...

We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids...

This paper systematically analyzes and enriches the observational learning paradigm of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992).

Knowledge management ca be seen as the pragmatic evolution of ideas in the field of organizational learning. Its main interest is the improvement of organizational capabilities on all levels of the organization through better use of the resource 'knowledge'.

The purpose of this article is to link the 'organizational learning perspective' and the 'resource-based view' to show how the development of organizational knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage. From the perspective of the resource-based view, the possession of unique knowledge can be...

The aim of this paper is to set the foundation of an approach of the diffusion-adoption problem of an innovation or a technological standard, based on the building of influence matrixes. This means that agents are to be considered as participating in social networks that provide the support and...

A canonical model of Bayesian learning is presented in which the interaction of the observation of discrete activities and the possibility of delaying actions generate informational externalities with generic properties: (i) strategic complementarities or substituabilities arise, depending on...