Showing 1 - 10 of 26
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120832
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009379484
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273921
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315977
This paper provides a novel microeconomic foundation for pecuniary human capital externalities in a labor market model of monopsonistic competition. Multiple equilibria arise because of a strategic complementarity in investment decisions. -- Externalities ; human capital ; multiple equilibria
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003759894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948846
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048955
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015193905
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157530
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009379495