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Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

Hofbauer, Josef (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001605387

Probabilistic interpretations of integrability for game dynamics

Sandholm, William H. - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 4 (2014) 1, pp. 95-106

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416235

Population games and determinstic evolutionary dynamics

Sandholm, William H. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498316

Chapter 13. Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

Sandholm, William H. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 703-778). 2015

Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025446

Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

Hofbauer, Josef (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002180352

Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization

Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Sandholm, William H. - In: Mathematics of operations research 41 (2016) 4, pp. 1297-1324

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011595060

Riemannian game dynamics

Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Sandholm, William H. - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 315-364

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025704

Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning

Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Sandholm, William H. - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 220 (2024), pp. 1-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015071007