We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and...

We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm the sender is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants the receivers. Although our experimental data reveals that senders messages convey truthful...

We study the dynamics of individual beliefs and information aggregation when agents communicate via a social network. We provide a general framework of social learning that captures the interactive effects of three main factors on the structure of individual beliefs resulting from such a dynamic...

Innovation support measures in the EU are mostly designed to support product innovation in RD intensive sectors. To increase the still considerable contribution to regional employment and competitiveness from SMEs in traditional manufacturing industries a broader innovation policy mix is more...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...

This risk.paper considers a simple learning process for decision problems under All behaviour change derives from the reinforcing or deterring effect of instantaneous payoff experiences. Payoff experiences are reinforcing or deterring depending on whether the payoff exceeds an aspiration level...