We study learning in perfect competition. A representative price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. Even though the firm is a price-taker, information is disseminated though the price. It is...

This chapter explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) for the study of economic systems. General points are concretely illustrated using an ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Six issues are highlighted: Constructive...

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This contribution focuses on the simulation of the emergence and evolution of communities of practice, a concept brought forwards originally in sociology in the early 90’s by Lave and Wenger (1990) and Brown and Duguid (1991). In a first part, the main theoretical principles on which relies...

We study learning in perfect competition. A price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. The presence of noise on the supply prevents perfect learning. Even though the firm is a price-taker,...

Workers learn on the job from both repetition and peers. Less understood is how specific types of experience and peer characteristics affect on-the-job learning. This likely differs by context (e.g., occupation, tasks, or roles). Absent such knowledge, it is unclear how to optimally assign...