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Monderer, Dov; Sela, Aner - 1998

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091033

Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values

Saran, Rene - 2010

uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks

Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman E. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 41-97

We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An \textit{underlying state} determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which others to form a costly \textit{communication link} with,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684965

Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach

Larson, Nathan; Elmaghraby, Wedad - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211215

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2021

Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312

Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon; … - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2022

Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive … cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476711

Asymmetric information in auctions : are resellers better appraisers?

Koptyug, Nikita - 2016

This paper shows that in online car auctions, resellers are better at appraising the value of the cars they are bidding … on than are consumers. Using a unique data set of online car auctions, I show that differences in bidding behavior … information, one in which consumers are subsidized and one in which consumers are allowed into all-reseller auctions. Finally, I …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430656

Information percolation in segmented markets

Duffie, Darrell; Malamud, Semyon; Manso, Gustavo - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 1-32

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042991