We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...

This paper provides evidence for informational spillovers within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. I identify three groups, a treatment group, a neighboring spillover group, and a non-adjacent pure control group. Mothers of children (aged 3-6 years) enrolled in government day-care centers are...

We develop a model of social learning from complementary information: Short-lived agents sequentially choose from a large set of flexibly correlated information sources for prediction of an unknown state, and information is passed down across periods. Will the community collectively acquire the...

We study observational learning among agents with coordination motives. On a discrete time line, communities of agents receive private information about an uncertain state, observe some predecessors' actions, and then take their own action. An agent's payoff is both state-dependent and...

This paper provides evidence for spillovers in learning and behavior within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. In an experiment, mothers of children (aged 3-6 years) enrolled in government day-care centers were provided recipe books to lower their price per calorie. Theory suggests that if...

This paper provides evidence for spillovers in learning and behavior within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. In a controlled experiment, mothers of children (aged 3-6 years) enrolled in government day-care centers were provided recipe books to lower their price per calorie. Spillovers to...

This paper provides evidence for informational spillovers within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. I identify three groups, a treatment group, a neighboring spillover group, and a non-adjacent pure control group. Mothers of children (aged 3-6 years) enrolled in government day-care centers are...

We study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the buyer's valuation and the seller's outside option. A long-lived seller makes offers to a long-lived buyer whose value is private information. There may exist a short-lived buyer whose value is higher than that of the long-lived buyer. The...

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives...