We report on an experiment exploring whether and how players may learn to use a random device to coordinate on a correlated equilibrium that Pareto dominates the Nash equilibria of a two-player Battle of the Sexes game. By contrast with other studies exploring recommendations and correlated...

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'European Economic Review' (2013). Vol. 61, pp. 186-204.<P> Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve...</p>

Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: (i) agents on average correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and (ii) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental...

We report on an experiment testing the empirical relevance of least squares (LS) learning, a common way of modelling how individuals learn a rational expectations equilibrium (REE). Subjects are endowed with the correct perceived law of motion (PLM) for a price level variable they are seeking to...

We report on experimental evidence rationalizing the use of heterogeneous agent models. We provide compelling evidence that subjects in laboratory experiments often behave in ways that depart from the rational choice ideal. Further, these subjects' heuristic approaches often differ from one...