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How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529
We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015047806
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning … discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze collusion schemes whereby … one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552475
Recent experimental simulations have shown that autonomous pricing algorithms are able to learn collusive behavior and thus charge supra-competitive prices without being explicitly programmed to do so. These simulations assume, however, that both firms employ the identical price-setting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013534374
We study relational contracts in a firm-worker relationship with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate output, and hence information about the match quality. Despite the absence of private information, uncertainty about match quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935641
We consider the problem of an employer who has to choose whether to reemploy agents with a positive track record or agents who were unsuccessful. While previously successful managers are likely to be of high ability, they have also accumulated wealth and will be harder to motivate in the future....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190118
An advocate for a special interest provides information to an uninformed planner for her to consider in making a sequence of important decisions. Although the advocate may have valuable information for the planner, it is is also known that the advocate is biased and will distort her advice if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684777
We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a choice between two actions: a safe action with known returns (exploitation) and a costly risky action with unknown returns (experimentation). We explicitly characterize the cheapest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135182