Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358106
This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponentsʼ behavior and to comply with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049668
Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875
This paper models the learning process of populations of randomly rematched tabula rasa neural network (NN) agents playing randomly generated 2×2 normal form games of all strategic classes. This approach has greater external validity than the existing models in the literature, each of which is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011057436
This paper addresses how neural networks learn to play one-shot normal form games through experience in an environment of randomly generated game payoffs and randomly selected opponents. This agent based computational approach allows the modeling of learning all strategic types of normal form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037725
This paper is concerned with the modeling of strategic change in humans’ behavior when facing different types of opponents. In order to implement this efficiently a mixed experimental setup was used where subjects played a game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for 100 rounds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789888
Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games, depends on which player yields first. If responders conceded first by accepting low offers, proposers, would not need to learn to offer more. Play would thus converge toward unequal sharing. If proposers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051797
Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008782796
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489955