Observational learning theories often assume that people's actions can be observed. However, in many naturally-occurring environments, individuals can choose whether to disclose their behavior to others. We provide theoretical analysis of observational learning under optional disclosure...

This paper examines whether investor learning about profitability (i.e., the mean of earnings distribution) leads to persistence in disclosure decisions. A repeated single-period model shows that persistent investor beliefs about profitability lead to persistent disclosure decisions. Using...

This paper studies the role of observational learning in search markets where buyers do not take the list price as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Using a unique data from the Beijing housing market, we estimate a structural model in which buyers infer a seller’s reservation value from the...

While mandatory disclosure provides benefits, it also entails costs. One such cost concerns managerial learning – by discouraging informed trading, disclosure could reduce managers' ability to glean decision-relevant information from prices. Using mandatory segment reporting in the U.S., we...

Observational learning theories often assume that people’s actions can be observed. Nevertheless, in many naturally occurring environments, individuals can choose whether to disclose their behavior to others. We theoretically analyze various disclosure rules and show that learning can be more...

We analyze how public disclosure of informed investors' trades results in manipulation, which in turn affects coordination and competition in a duopolistic setting. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profit is ambiguous. When informed...