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I study a discrete-time dynamic bargaining game in which a buyer can choose to learn privately about her value of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832420
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An \textit{underlying state} determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which others to form a costly \textit{communication link} with,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684965
We analyze a continuous-time bargaining game of two-sided incomplete information without time discounting. Consistent … to which players learn about their types during the bargaining process. Under some conditions, there exist equilibria of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028400
We study dynamic bargaining with uncertainty over the buyer's valuation and the seller's outside option. A long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081626
Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756276
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014
We consider a war of attrition with stochastic deadlines in which the players can learn about the state that determines their payoffs at deadline. We study how the players' incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and what implications these incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165971
This paper considers the dynamic lot sizing problem of H. M. Wagner and T. M. Whitin with the assumption that the total cost of n setups is a concave nondecreasing function of n. Such setup costs could arise from the worker learning in setups and/or technological improvements in setup methods....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218587
In the face of demand uncertainty, a monopolist can observe sales as a controlled reaction to its price and advertising so as to improve the choice of this marketing mix in the future. Furthermore, to upgrade its knowledge about demand the firm has the option to invest in external market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910797
We study the effect of learning with heterogeneous beliefs on the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. To that end, we extend the Great Fish War model of Levhari and Mirman (1980) to a learning environment in which several agents interact strategically and learn about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091946