A decision maker offers a new product to a fixed number of adopters. The decision maker does not know the value of the product while adopters receive some private information about the value. We study how the decision maker may influence learning among adopters by manipulating the launch...

In this paper we study long-term learning process under the conditions of ambiguous information. We study a unique empirical setting in which pieces of the ambiguous information are sequentially provided to institutional investors. We use parametric and non-parametric models to show that the...

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data that contain detailed information on individual workers' performance. We find that a 10 percent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 percent of a standard deviation. This translates to an...

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data that contain detailed information on individual workers' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. This translates to an...

We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers engage in learning and information is conveyed through the price system. Specifically, since the learning process yields uncertainty, we study the effect of risk aversion on the equilibrium outcomes of the model,...

Empirical research has found evidence of predatory pricing in a number of industries. Leading firms in airlines, coffee, oil, shipping, sugar, telecommunications, and tobacco have used deep, temporary price cuts to weaken their competitors and preserve or enhance their long-run market power....

Increasingly, firms use algorithms powered by artificial intelligence to set prices. Previous research studies interactions among Q-learning algorithms in a simulated oligopoly model of price competition. The algorithms learn collusive strategies but require a long time that corresponds to...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided mar- ket. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...