, deals with bidders' anticipated regrets from winning and from losing the auction. It exploits the stochastic properties of … the auction format and rationalizes: (i) Nash equilibrium bidding, (ii) (non-)monotone overbidding and (iii) fully cursed …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

formation efficiency in this setup to see how fast prices become informative about the final auction value. We find that prices … from their competitors' bidding behaviour and validates the choice of the agency to implement the auction in the present …

mechanism when the subjects received the endowment two weeks before the experiment day. Each auction was repeated for 20 rounds … subjects gained experience over repeated auction rounds, implying a possible learning effect and suggesting that “bounded …

markets in silico, using electricity markets and on-line double auctions as illustrations. A monopoly sealed-bid auction is … examined in the tenth paper, and a new auction mechanism is evolved and analyzed. The chapter concludes that, as modeling the …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …