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) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information … to form a costly \textit{communication link} with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a \textit …{private signal} correlated with the underlying state, they exchange information over the induced \textit{communication network} until …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684965
This paper studies the interaction between coordination and social learning in a dynamic regime change game. Social learning provides public information, to which players overreact due to the coordination motive. Coordination affects the aggregation of private signals through players' optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008554
We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric threshold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263855
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001529148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993778
In this paper I study the economics of self-enforcing international environmental agreements where agents never know what exactly the state of the world is. Explicitly, I consider countries using Bayesian learning to update their beliefs on the state of the world. Using a very simple framework...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164277