Purpose: There is no learning without making mistakes. Collaboration, knowledge, and learning culture shape organizational behaviors. Hence, this study aims to develop a theoretical model of the above constructs to determine how mistakes are related to organizational intelligence based on the...

Abstract: Change adaptability reflects intelligence and learning capacity. Mistakes are powerful in relation to teaching potency and learning efficacy, but they are not likely to be accepted by organizations. This has become a serious organizational problem. Is it possible to learn without...

We investigate how auditors learn the technical aspects of their professional role while performing client engagements, and how that learning process has been shaped by changes in societal, economic and regulatory forces. Prior studies explicitly recognize that auditors need social skills and...

To what degree is leaders’ vulnerable involvement in employees’ deliberations essential for effective leadership of inter-kibbutz co-operatives (IKCs)? A unique semi-native anthropology of outsider-managed automatic processing inter-kibbutz plants and parent IKCs suggests that such...

Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable theta and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information acquisition...

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition...

This paper examines social learning when only one of the two types of decisions is observable. Because agents arrive randomly over time, and only those who invest are observed, later agents face a more complicated inference problem than in the standard model, as the absence of investment might...

We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a choice between two actions: a safe action with known returns (exploitation) and a costly risky action with unknown returns (experimentation). We explicitly characterize the cheapest...