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Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game

Murphy, Ryan O.; Rapoport, Amnon; Parco, James E. - 2008

We consider mixed populations (N=21) of genuine (humans) and artificial (robots) agents, repeatedly interacting in small groups whose composition is changed randomly from round to round. Our purpose is to study the spread of cooperative or non-cooperative behavior in the population over time by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028816

Learning dynamics and norm psychology supports human cooperation in a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma on networks

Realpe-Gómez, John; Vilone, Daniele; Andrighetto, Giulia; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/90, pp. 1-14

In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the … balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment …-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014880

Social learning strategies and cooperative behaviour : evidence of payoff bias, but not prestige or conformity, in a social dilemma game

Watson, Robin; Morgan, Thomas J. H.; Kendal, Rachel L.; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-26

Human cooperation, occurring without reciprocation and between unrelated individuals in large populations, represents … via social learning. Using an online social dilemma experiment, we find evidence that participants' contributions were … evidence for lower cooperation (i) when exposed to social information about peer cooperation levels than without such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698108

Does social learning promote cooperation in social dilemmas?

Aydogmus, Ozgur; Cagatay, Hasan; Gürpınar, Erkan - In: Journal of economic interaction and coordination 15 (2020) 3, pp. 633-648

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012296907

Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav - 2022

beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013345861

The impact of naïve advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games

Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - 2007 - This version: January 24, 2007

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350357

Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty

Gallice, Andrea - 2019

We present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of … emerge in equilibrium. The same environment leads to full cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901935

The impact of naive advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games

Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - 2007 - This version: January 24, 2007

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728176

The impact of nai͏̈ve advice and observational learning in beauty-contest games

Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003465078

Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information

Kets, Willemien - 2013

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099