Financial literacy has become a topic of major importance for scholars and policy-makers. While recent evidence confirms positive effects of financial education, there is a call for more detailed information about instructional and learning contexts that motivates the search for good practices....

We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

This paper uses an experimental design of voluntary information acquisition to assess the information assumptions of different learning models. The design is implemented in two-stage asymmetric-information games. Subjects' information-seeking behavior reveals that they tend to choose certain...

We test, via cross-cultural comparison, the robustness of complex tacit coordination in an endogenous-grouping mechanism originally introduced and experimentally tested by Gunnthorsdottir, Vragov, Seifert and McCabe, 2010. The authors call their mechanism "Group-based Meritocracy...

We aim to understand fundamental preferences over fairness and cooperation embedded in artificial intelligence (AI). We do this by having a large language model (LLM), GPT-3.5, play two classic games: the dictator game and the prisoner's dilemma. We compare the decisions of the LLM to those of...

We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn `across games' by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent's individual solution concept is represented by a...