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Learning faster or more precisely? : strategic experimentation in networks

Wuggenig, Mirjam - 2014

The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by … network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to … increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010441988

Adaptive learning in weighted network games

Bayer, Péter; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Peeters, Ronald - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 105 (2019), pp. 250-264

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131965

Equilibrium play and learning in a stochastic public goods experiment

Banerjee, Priyodorshi; Chakravarty, Sujoy; Mohanty, Ruchika - In: Journal of quantitative economics : official journal of … 10 (2012) 2, pp. 59-77

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338418

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2003 - This version: July 9, 2003

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440933

Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism

Arifovic, Jasmina; Ledyard, John O. - In: Journal of public economics 96 (2012) 9/10, pp. 808-823

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702473

The evolution of sanctioning institutions : an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; De Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411226

Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation

Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490237

Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation

Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - In: Journal of economic theory 169 (2017), pp. 234-269

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011747662

Modelling contributions in public good games with punishment

Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016

Theoretical models have had difficulties to account, at the same time, for the most important stylized facts observed in experiments of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. A recent approach tackling that gap is Arifovic and Ledyard (2012), which implements social preferences in tandem with an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569202