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This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647
Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest in quantity and quality of output. We use data from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281805
Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest in quantity and quality of output. We use data from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001672586
Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest in quantity and quality of output. We use data from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107721
This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are compensated by positive continuation-value and selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049077
This paper studies the performance of promotion tournaments with heterogeneous participants in two dimensions: incentive provision and selection. Our theoretical analysis reveals a trade-off for the tournament designer between the two goals: While total effort is maximized if less heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308037
This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one-stage) and dynamic (two-stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260055