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It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914
learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326679
learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014085
understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010364492
firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit pre-emption. Learning; Pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636
results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281423
makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria - ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885
Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025446