Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …

version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about …We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection … uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs. …

We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience … from the learning by doing effect …

learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …

where both risky arms are of the same type, we find that learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the …

always exists an equilibrium exhibiting efficient long-run patterns of learning. These results extend to a three-player game …

of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment … understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …