A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For some simple examples we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play

A simple asset pricing model with two types of adaptively learning traders,fundamentalists and technical analysts, is studied. Fractions of these tradertypes, which are both boundedly rational, change over time according toevolutionary learning, with technical analysts conditioning their...

A simple asset pricing model with two types of adaptively learning traders,fundamentalists and technical analysts, is studied. Fractions of these tradertypes, which are both boundedly rational, change over time according toevolutionary learning, with technical analysts conditioning their...

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a...

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous- time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier by Brown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently been suggested as a plausible...