We study a social learning model with payoff externalities in which one of two state-dependent games is chosen at random and then played repeatedly by a different group of agents. Each "generation" observes the history of actions and receives conditionally independent private signals about the...

This paper provides a model of social learning where the order in which actions are taken is determined by an m-dimensional integer lattice rather than along a line as in the herding model. The observation structure is determined by a random network. Every agent links to each of his preceding...

Two firms produce substitute goods with unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will...

We study a model of opinion exchange in social networks where a state of the world is realized and every agent receives a zero-mean noisy signal of the realized state. It is known from Golub and Jackson that under DeGroot \cite{degroot1974reaching} dynamics agents reach a consensus that is close...

We analyze boundedly rational updating from aggregate statistics in a modelwith binary actions and binary states. Agents each take an irreversible action in sequence after observing the unordered set of previous actions. Each agent first forms her prior based on the aggregate statistic, then...