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Strive to be first or avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2015

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different … tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337036

Strive to be first and avoid being last : an experiment on relative performance incentives ; conference paper

Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Lindner, Florian; … - 2013

Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the … levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward … and punishment. We test the model s predictions in a laboratory experiment and find that the combination of reward and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340563

Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games

Bayer, Ralph-C.; Renner, Elke; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2009

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343917

Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2003 - This version: July 9, 2003

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440933

Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners

Frick, Mira; Ishii, Yuhta - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1505-1541

We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135353

Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023

Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Hierarchical experimentation

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343543

Market-based tournaments : an experimental investigation

Dickmanns, Lisa; Gürtler, Marc; Gürtler, Oliver - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 51 (2018), pp. 294-306

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012129719

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526