The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a...

In standard models of contracts, efficient incentives require the promisor to pay damages for non-performance and the promisee to receive no damages. To give efficient incentives to both parties, we propose a novel contract requiring the promisor to pay damages for nonperformance to a third...

Like constructing a building, performance on many contracts occurs in phases. As time passes, the promisor sinks more costs into performance and less expenditure remains. For phased performance, we show that optimal liability for the breaching party decreases as the remaining costs of completing...

Under the usual tort rules, damages for an accident equal the victim's loss (compensation). This paper departs from current law by proposing damages equal to the injurer's gain from untaken precaution divided by the probability of liability (disgorgement damages for accidents, or DDA). DDA is...

This paper reviews the economic analysis of economic damages, shows the paradoxes of its extension to non-economic damages, and then turns to the three damage measures — value of statistical life (VSL), happiness equivalent, and Hand Rule Damages (HRD)

This Article explores the divergence in law and convergence in economics in dealing with harms and benefits. While tort law usually makes the injurer internalize wrongful harms through damages, restitution law does not enable the benefactor to internalize the benefits she confers on others...