Showing 1 - 10 of 12
This article uncovers the role of framing in the determination of negligence. Negligence disputes fall into two categories: cases in which injurers inflicted harm while seeking to avoid a loss to themselves (loss frame), and those in which they were seeking to obtain a personal gain (gain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294470
The chapter, in the Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law, discusses the contributions of cognitive psychology and behavioral studies to the research of tort law. These contributions, we show, relate to a wide range of issues in torts: from the basic decision to impose tort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142309
An injurer's activity often exposes multiple victims to the risk of harm. We show that under negligence, the tort system's dominant regime, such victims face a collective-action problem in choosing their activity levels. An increase in one victim's activity level confers a positive externality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036390
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012881242
Tort law consists of multiple doctrines governing the assignment of liability and the calculation of damages. But in what sequence should courts apply these doctrines? Does it matter, for example, whether a court applies comparative fault before or after mitigation of damages? The answer, rather...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013233653
Conventional wisdom in law and economics has long been that negligence-based regimes induce optimal care but encourage excessive activity. This paper demonstrates that when behavior involves multiple victims or injurers, negligence-based regimes can create a collective action problem which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192843
When harm is caused by multiple injurers, damages are allocated among the responsible injurers in proportion to their relative responsibility for harm. This Article shows that a proportional allocation of liability between strictly-liable injurers distorts incentives to take precautions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595240
Extensive literature has shown that assignment of liability for a single harm to multiple injurers undermines incentives for optimal care. As each potential injurer anticipates bearing only a fraction of the harm, incentives to take precautions are often diluted. The dilution-of-liability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251702
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009554547