We analyze a monopolist who offers different variants of a possibly dangerous product to heterogeneous customers. Product variants are distinguished by different safety attributes. Customers choose product usage which co- determines expected harm. We find that, even with customers being...

This paper studies the differential effects of fines and damages on people's investment in accident prevention. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which monetary payoffs are maintained across the two policy instruments. While standard theory predicts no difference in behavior, we...

In this paper, we examine the link between innovative activity on the part of firms, the competitive pressure to introduce innovations and punitive damage awards. While innovative activity brings forth valuable new products for consumers, competitive pressure in the ensuing innovation race...

This paper establishes that tort damages multipliers higher than one can be an instrument to induce imperfectly competitive producers to invest in product safety at socially optimal levels. In their selection of product safety levels, producers seek to maximize profits, neglecting the fact that...

In this paper, we examine the link between innovative activity on the part of firms, the competitive pressure to introduce innovations and optimal damages awards. While innovative activity brings forth valuable new products for consumers, competitive pressure in the ensuing innovation race...

In the economic analysis of liability law, information about accident risk and how it can be influenced by precautions is commonly taken for granted. However, a profound understanding of the relationship between care and accident risk often requires learning-by-doing. In a two-period model, we...