In the last several years, competition agencies around the world have imposed or considered imposing extra-jurisdictional remedies on patent holders, particularly owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) upon which the patent holder has made a commitment to license on fair, reasonable, and...

This comment is submitted to the U.S. Antitrust Agencies by the Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) at Scalia Law School, George Mason University on the Agencies' Proposed Update of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. The GAI Competition Advocacy Program provides a...

In the last year, we have seen a growing — and troubling — trend as courts and competition agencies around the globe propose and impose antitrust sanctions on holders of standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) for seeking injunctive relief against alleged infringers and for reneging on their...

This note provides an economic approach to antitrust analysis of differential pricing (here, used synonymously with “price discrimination”) and discriminatory refusals to license; grantbacks and cross-licenses; and no-challenge clauses. The analysis applies to both intellectual property...

Investigations and litigation involving standard-essential patents (SEPs) have begun to spring up around the globe. In February 2014, the Korean Fair Trade Commission issued its first decision on the issue of whether seeking injunctive relief on a FRAND-encumbered SEP constitutes a violation of...

The GAI submitted comments in response to a public consultation by the Japan Patent Office (JPO) regarding its Draft Guide for SEP (standard-essential patent) Licensing Negotiations. The GAI comments encouraged the JPO to acknowledge the platform characteristics of standard-setting organizations...

We submit this comment in response to the request of the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and National Institute of Standards and Technology to comment on the proposed Draft Policy Statement (DPS) on Licensing Negotiations and Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents...

This comment is submitted in response to the Japan Patent Office's request for comments on its Guidelines for Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents. The Global Antitrust Institute's Competition Advocacy Program provides a wide-range of recommendations to facilitate adoption...

It has been commonly argued that the decision of a large number of inventors to license complementary patents necessary for the development of a product leads to excessively large royalties. This well-known Cournot-complements or royalty-stacking effect would hurt efficiency and downstream...