We study a simple model of market making in which high-frequency market makers can cancel limit orders quickly after receiving an adverse signal. The resulting winner's curse induces low-frequency market makers to widen bid-ask spreads. Liquidity in the market may deteriorate unless...

Speeding up the exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, more speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update his quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces his payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes...

Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges pay a fixed transaction cost (gas price) whenever they update their positions. Different economies of scale across LPs lead in equilibrium to the fragmentation of liquidity supply between low- and high-fee pools. Using data on liquidity...

Trading activity surges associated with latency arbitrage are costly, as they lead to both lower liquidity and inefficient investments in order processing capacity that remains idle 90% of the time. A congestion message fee on liquidity-taking orders alleviates both concerns. The fee surges...

We model how ETFs compete and set fees. We show that ETF secondary market liquidity plays a key role in determining fees and leads to liquidity clienteles. More liquid ETFs charge higher fees in equilibrium and attract shorter horizon investors that are more sensitive to liquidity than to fees....