Traditional liquidity measures can provide a false impression of the liquidity and stability of financial market trading. Using data on auctions (bids wanted in competition; BWICs) from the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) market, we show that a standard measure of liquidity, the effective...

In this paper we present a general equilibrium model to analyze competition between multiple venues (dealers), endogenous market segmentation, transaction speeds and fees, trading volume, optimal regulator's choice for taxing traders, and welfare in illiquid asset markets. Differences in trading...

This paper illustrates channels by which regulations that require banks to hold liquid assets can either increase or decrease a bank's incentive to take risk with its remaining ineligible assets. A greater capacity to respond to liquidity stress increases the potential profits a bank would put...

We examine the system-wide effects of liquidity regulation on banks’ balance sheets. In the general equilibrium model, banks have to hold liquid assets, and choose among illiquid assets varying in the extent to which they are difficult to value before maturity, e.g., structured securities. By...

Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. Whether dealers in such a market operate competitively is an empirical issue, but a difficult one to study. Data in such markets is generally not centrally recorded. We analyze a...

This paper examines the role of bond ratings and the effects of rating-based regulations in thecorporate bond market. Exploiting an unanticipated mechanical change in how the benchmarkLehman bond indices are constructed in 2005, we show that rating-induced market segmentationof the bond market...