We argue that a one-penny minimum tick size for all stocks priced above $1 (SEC rule 612) encourages high-frequency trading and taker/maker–fee markets. We find that non-high frequency traders (non-HFTers) are 2.62 times more likely than HFTers to provide best prices, thereby establishing...

We show that queueing rationing under price controls drives high-frequency trading. A one-cent uniform tick size (minimal price variation) creates rents and generates queues for liquidity provision, particularly for securities with lower prices (larger relative tick sizes). Speed rations the...

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms designed to minimize transaction costs for buy-side institutions (B-Algos). Under continuous pricing, B-Algos dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to...

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms (EAs) designed to minimize investors' transaction costs. Under continuous pricing, EAs dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to stimulate HFTs' market...

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms designed to minimize transaction costs for buy-side institutions (B-Algos). Under continuous pricing, B-Algos dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to...

We track information diffusion in real time by monitoring how the news is tweeted and retweeted on Twitter. We find that news diffusion is highly correlated with intraday trading, especially for retail trading. News diffusion leads to a lower bid-ask spread and price pressure on the news day...