This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross-border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of...

This paper examines the effect of cross-border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two-stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly...

We consider the interactions between domestic lobbying and two types of cross-border lobbying in a Customs Union (CU). The two types of cross-border lobbying are (i) lobbying from firms in one CU country to the governments of other CU countries, and (ii) that from firms outside the CU. We focus...