This paper develops an equilibrium matching model for a competitive CEO market in which CEOs’ wage and perks are both endogenously determined by bargaining between firms and CEOs. In stable matching equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more...

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...

What are the sources of rapid wage growth during a worker's early career? To address this question, I construct and estimate a model of strategic wage bargaining with on-the-job search to explore three different components of wages: general human capital, match-specific capital, and bargaining...

This paper constructs and estimates a career decision model where individuals search for both career matching and employer matching to understand wage growth and career mobility using the NLSY79. It departs from previous papers in that career mobility decisions and participation decisions are...