In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...

Deregulation and managerial compensation are two important topics on the political and academic agenda. The former has been a significant policy recommendation in light of the negative effects associated with overly restrictive regulation on markets and the economy. The latter relates to the...

Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...

In this exploratory research, and driven by intense interest in media focused attention on the apparently wide differential in pay contrast between US top managers in large corporations versus their non-US top managers, we examined the backgrounds of the highest paid Chief Executive Officers...

This paper provides evidence about CEO remuneration structure and levels, as well as key CEO and board attributes, for a large sample of listed Australian firms during the 2004-2006 period. As such it provides recent evidence about how Australian executives are rewarded and permits observation...

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...

After the SEC mandates the disclosure of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)' compensation in 2006, CFO pay increases significantly relative to CEO pay, particularly in firms most affected by the mandate. CFOs (but not CEOs) are more likely to leave their firms following poor performance. Earnings...

This paper studies costly pre-CEO executive skill accumulation by executives, followed by stable matching between firms and CEOs. An increase in the heterogeneity of firm size relative to executive type induces a decrease in the informational effect of skill accumulation, resulting in...