This paper shows that the adoption of flexible manufacturing techniques by firms leads to a tougher price regime. This need not benefit consumers since the tougher regime deters entry and facilitates segmented market structures.

Price markups over marginal cost are often higher on "aftermarket" parts, service, and supplies for durable goods that they are on the goods themselves. One explanation for this phonomenons is that the aftermarket good is used as a "metering" device to price discriminate among consumer, a model...

In a model of horizontal product differentiation, we show that local monopolied may exist under free entry when capital is perfectly mobile. In contrast both with the situation of restricted entry and with the zero-profit approach to free entry outcomens of Salop 91979), the unit profit rate of...

This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies : standard technologies used by non-integrated firms, and...

In this note we show that playsible differences in quality and production costs of durables and non-durables necessariloy lead to the sale of a product mix in the market over time.

In this paper we consider the spatial model by Anderson and Neven (1991) to study the subgame perfect equilibria without restricting the consumers' reservation price. New equilibria emerge where firms locate at disperse points in space. Also, at equilibrium, firms may monopolize some segments of...

In this paper we present new estimates of the degree of welfare loss in Australian manufacturing for the period 1982/3 - 1984/5.

We present a model of spatial competition where transport costs are dependent on the price the monopolist sets in the market. Several specifications of the transport costs are modeled. We find that, in contrast with a standard Hotelling model, the monoplist decides to cover all the market...

This paper constructs a simple repeated game model to analyze how industry outcomes alter if a regulated input monopolist is allowed to integrate into the downstream retail market. Integration helps overcome double marginalization-a feature well known in the existing literature. Unlike existing...