We study an endogenous business cycle model with Cournotian monopolistic competition and an endogenous number of firms in each sector. Our model is a simple general equilibrium macroeconomic model introducing overlapping generations both of consumers and firms. Firms strategically decide on...

We endogenise the objective of a monopoly firm in a general equilibrium context. Within this framework a distributional conflict occurs between shareholders, depending on their endowments. Following a political-economy approach and using voting theory, the production plan of the firm is...

Price markups over marginal cost are often higher on "aftermarket" parts, service, and supplies for durable goods that they are on the goods themselves. One explanation for this phonomenons is that the aftermarket good is used as a "metering" device to price discriminate among consumer, a model...

A monopolist firm sells a single product to a market where the customers may be enticed to accept a delay in when their orders are shipped. The enticement is a discounted price for the product. The market consists of several segments with different degrees of aversion to delays. The firm offers...

Our results seem to provide substantial evidence that joint operating agreement's (JOA) act as constrained rather than unconstrained monopolists in setting ad rates and circulation levels. The constraint of having to produce two dailies binds tightly enough to yield JOA CPM's that are much...

This paper shows that the adoption of flexible manufacturing techniques by firms leads to a tougher price regime. This need not benefit consumers since the tougher regime deters entry and facilitates segmented market structures.

In this paper we investigate why regulators may wish to open regulated markets to entry by unregulated firms. We adopt Posner's view of regulation as a taxation scheme, whereby regulators set high rates in some markets in order to subsidize other markets.