The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.

338: I examine the standard assumption in the moral hazard agency literature that the principal has all the bargaining power at the contract offer stage. When the agent has limited liability, as is often the case in practice, the contract changes according to the distribution of bargaining...

We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this by using studies of traditional and business-format-franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales- force-integration...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.

The purpose of this paper is to study the prevention impact upon the economic dynamics. We use an overlapping-generations model with production in which we have introduced a financial loss for households. This risk is endogenous and depends on the individual prevention levels. The dynamic paths...

This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment. If investments are publicly observable, pension benefits must be linked positively to the level of...

Обсуждение трудовых контрактов высших менеджеров частных компаний в нашей стране часто сопровождается призывами к созданию такой системы компенсации, которая...

We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...