financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance … ; executives ; risk taking ; age ; gender ; education …. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of …

to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and …We study if the regulation of bank executive compensation has unintended consequences. Based on novel data on CEO and … non-CEO executives in EU banking, we show that capping the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio did not induce executives …

fixed compensation sufficed to retain the vast majority of non-CEO executives and those at well performing banks. We fail to … find evidence that banks with executives that are more affected by the bonus cap became less risky. In fact, numerous …We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable …

retain executives. However, risk-adjusted bank performance deteriorated, consistent with reduced incentives to exert effort …We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping the share of variable … compensation did not induce an executive director exodus from EU banking because banks raised fixed compensation sufficiently to …