Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between...

Theory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager's career concerns are associated with a...

Using a unique, hand-gathered sample of 893 forward-looking voluntary disclosures by 70 proxy contest firms during 1992–2001, we examine whether managers temporarily alter the frequency and tone of their disclosures during proxy contests. Broadly consistent with the corporate control contest...

Approximately 90 percent of managers' earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with their firm's current earnings announcement – a practice referred to as the “bundling” of earnings information. We examine whether managers bias these forecasts conditional on the news conveyed in...