We investigate the financial result of boards' choices to promote a new CEO from within the firm or hire externally, at large U.S. public firms between 1986 and 2005. This choice theoretically maximizes profits. Additionally, choosing a new CEO from outside the firm influences labor market...

We explore the effectiveness of the clawback provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as a deterrent to earnings manipulations. Using a sample of firms that issued “high concern” earnings restatements, we estimate the career and monetary benefits the CEO...

We examine the financial performance that boards of large U.S. firms realize by their decision to hire a new CEO from within the firm versus externally. Using a structural self-selection modeling approach, we find, for boards that promote internally, greater total cash flows than would have been...

We investigate the association between financial performance and CEO hiring source: internal promotion or external firm. This analysis includes all U.S. CEOs in established public firms from 1986 to 2005. The results show that in large firms, internal hires provide significantly higher median...

We explore whether clawback provisions (i.e. Dodd-Frank and SOX) can mitigate agency problems by deterring the executives from manipulating earnings in an effort to boost their incentive compensation. We estimate the direct and indirect gains executives receive as a result of manipulating...