We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm’s performance and more for their rivals’ performance if an industry’s firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

Top management structures in large US firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team — the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO — doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather...

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the incentives faced by U.S. managers in the form of wage structures, promotion premia, and job turnover. We use a panel of executives and measure foreign competition as import penetration. Using tariffs and exchange rates as...

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team – the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO – doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in...

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management...

This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of...

This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than general managers. Using panel data on senior management...