Using a sample of domestic U.S. equity mutual funds, we find strong evidence that investors respond to managerial replacements. We find that the top performing funds that have a change in management subsequently have lower flows compared to funds of which the manager is retained. On top of that,...

Mutual fund companies frequently assign multiple funds to one portfolio manager. This study examines the consequences of such “multitasking” arrangements. We find that, despite fund companies choosing more qualified managers to run multiple funds, multitasking is associated with...

We find a negative relation between hedge fund manager’s personal income tax rates and fund performance. Using changes in tax deferral regulation or state-level tax rates suggest causality in the tax-performance relation. Managers are less likely to hold stocks with greater information...

Using a regulation that increased portfolio disclosure frequency of US mutual funds as an exogenous shock shortening funds’ investment horizon, we find that affected funds influence portfolio firms to reduce the pay duration of their executives to incentivize them to also have shorter...

This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be bene cial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement...

We examine the determinants and consequences of mutual fund managers simultaneously managing multiple funds. Well-performing managers multitask by taking over poorly performing funds or launching new funds. Subsequent to multitasking, funds run by managers prior to multitasking (i.e., incumbent...