This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

We examine executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of small privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart — in 1993 and 2003. We find that executive pay at small privately held firms increases with firm size and varies widely by industry,...

This study examines the determinants of executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart-in 1993 and 2003 — and uses these data to test a number of hypotheses. We find that: (i) the level of executive pay...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of non-publicly traded corporations. We find that CEO compensation is higher at C corporations than at S corporations, consistent with view that CEOs of small firms can reduce the effect...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

This paper studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A theoretical model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive suggests that 1) in principle, excessive risk taking (in the form of risk shifting) may be addressed by...